

**Congress of the United States**  
Washington, DC 20515

April 26, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


The Kingdom of Morocco, one of our oldest and closest allies, recently submitted a proposal to resolve the three decade long struggle over the Western Sahara. This historic initiative grants profound local autonomy to the Western Sahara while recognizing Morocco's territorial integrity. This compromise is a breakthrough opportunity to find an enduring political solution, and U.S. support is critical to its successful implementation.

As you know, the conflict in the Western Sahara has gone on for too long at great humanitarian cost. Since the 1991 UN imposed cease-fire, all efforts to provide a realistic and durable solution to the conflict have failed. The new Moroccan proposal provides a realistic framework for a negotiated political solution, which is the best way to ensure a lasting peace for all parties.


The United States has a major national security interest in the stability and economic prosperity of North Africa. With al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups expanding their presence into North Africa, we are concerned that the failure to resolve this conflict of more than 30 years poses a danger to U.S. and regional security, while simultaneously preventing the economic integration of the Arab Maghreb Union.

The Moroccan autonomy proposal constitutes an historic opportunity for the United States to help end this problem and provide a better future for the entire region. We urge you to embrace this promising Moroccan initiative so that it receives the consideration necessary to achieve international acceptance.

Sincerely,



Tomi Lantz



Lincoln Diaz-Balart (FL)  
Tom Lantos (CA)

David Scott (GA)  
Art Davis (AL)  
Tom Allen (ME)  
David Wu (OR)  
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Keith Ellison (MN)  
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Thelma Drake (VA)  
Spencer Bachus (AL)  
Nathan Deal (GA)  
Lamar Smith (TX)  
Bob Goodlatte (VA)

Darrell Issa (CA)  
Ted Poe (TX)  
Connie Mack (FL)  
Pete Sessions (TX)  
Devin Nunes (CA)  
Tom Price (GA)  
Mike Simpson (ID)  
Sam Johnson (TX)  
Tom Petri (WI)  
Mike Ferguson (NJ)

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Pat Tiberi (OH)  
Rodney Frelinghuysen (NJ)  
Ray LaHood (IL)  
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Jerry Weller (IL)  
Buck McKeon (CA)  
Jim Saxton (NJ)

James Scott Oct 13<sup>th</sup>  
Chris Ann

Tom Allen

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Jan Courtney

Allyce J. Sawant

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Jane Hanna

Tracy B.

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Bill DeLakus

Barry Frank

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Carol M. Ford

Jim Whithell

Errol L. Engel

Alfred Harty

Ruben Hingjosa

W. B. Hingjosa

Off Hingjosa

Tom Hingjosa

James E. Hingjosa

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Chris Hingjosa

Tony Balch

Vern J. Ehlert

Kath Ehlert

John Ehlert

Pat Ehlert

Steve Ehlert

Ken Klein

Brian Hingjosa

Chris Hingjosa



Shelley Berkley  
~~Shelley Berkley~~

Bro Cramer

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Marcy Kaptur

Bob Filner

~~Barack~~

Norm Dicks

Jim Moran

Eel Pastor

Gerold Muller

John Seng  
~~John Seng~~

Leonard & Bruce

Art Rahay

~~Gene Dukunov~~

Tom Hingell

Brad Sherman

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Eric Cantor

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E. Brown



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John Davis VA-01


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Sp. T. Baker


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
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
Bob Goodlatte





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























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
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
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
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
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 Paper



John L. Bido

Tom Kennedy

And. Chan

J. J. A.

Scott Hamlin '05

Phil English

W. B. Perry

Sam. Allen

Wm. T. D. Little  
James

Erving Brown to Jute

Bill Shuster

E. L. Brown

Pat. J. Tibben

RP Deligier

Wm. J. Lathrop

W. P. B. A.

Wm. W. W.

Buck McLean

J. S. S.

April 14, 2009

Daniel B. Pickard  
202.719.7285  
dpickard@wileyrein.com

**BY HAND DELIVERY**

Heather H. Hunt, Chief  
U.S. Department of Justice  
National Security Division  
Counterespionage/Registration Unit  
1400 New York Avenue, N.W.  
First Floor - Public Office Suite 100  
Washington, D.C. 20005

**Re: Short Form Registration Statements for LeClairRyan  
Registration # 5901**

Dear Ms. Hunt:

On behalf of LeClairRyan, please find enclosed, in triplicate, the Short-Form Registration Statement for Krystal J. Williams and Christopher B. Ashby, filed pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act.


If you have any questions regarding this matter, please contact me at the number listed above.

Sincerely,

Daniel B. Pickard  
Counsel to LeClairRyan

Enclosures

2009 APR 14 PM 4:30  
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## North Africa Policy Paper Project

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The Conflict Management Program, SAIS (Professor I William Zartman)

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Senior Fellow, Director, International Center for Terrorism Studies, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies

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## Why the Maghreb Matters: Threats, Opportunities, and Options for Effective American Engagement in North Africa

### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


The Maghreb matters to the United States for reasons ranging from its strategic geographic position on the Mediterranean and at the western end of the Arab-Muslim world, to the threats posed by the increase in terrorism in the region, to the economic opportunities and resources it offers the US. The US needs a policy to promote American interests in the area by treating the five North African states as a region and working to strengthen the economic and security ties among them – and with the US and Europe – and by taking the lead in promoting a resolution to the Western Sahara conflict based on the proposal of autonomy within Moroccan sovereignty now on the table at the United Nations (UN) and supported by a bipartisan consensus in the US Congress.

Hitherto, the Maghreb – composed of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia, members of the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA in its local acronym) – has been relegated to a marginal status in foreign policy as the neglected area between the Middle East and Africa. Despite its historic relations with the US and its importance in terms of energy, security, stability, trade, development, and other issues of concern, it has often been viewed by the US as a European responsibility.

The US has significant interests in the region that should be focused on promoting stability and security of the individual countries to enable them to move toward greater regional economic and policy integration, and cooperation with the US and the European Union (EU) to enhance prospects for greater political freedoms and broader economic growth.

Stronger policies for trade and investment internally and externally, more effective cooperation in counterterrorism efforts, stronger links between the public sector and civil society, and resolute mechanisms to resolve differences would benefit the countries themselves as well as the US. A thorough study in 2008 by the Peterson Institute for International Economics outlined the benefits that would result from greater regional economic integration and Atlantic cooperation. The single greatest obstacle to this integration is the Western Sahara conflict. Ongoing negotiations at the UN have brought no discernable progress. This stalemate must be brought to an end if the larger issues of integration are to be addressed.


Six premises for US foreign policy in North Africa are proposed. First, the Maghreb matters to the US, for security, geopolitical, historical, and economic reasons. Second, it is important to treat the Maghreb as a region, deserving focused attention within the broader Middle East and North Africa. Third, the US should clearly define its goals for promoting security and stability in the region, within the Obama administration's global mission. Fourth, the US should work more effectively with the EU to build strong incentives to promote greater economic integration. Fifth, the US should devise broader and more effective programs to promote security and to combat terrorism in the region. **Finally, the US must work diligently with its friends to resolve the stalemate over the Western Sahara. The formula of autonomy/sovereignty now before the UN is the basis for a viable solution that has**



**been endorsed by previous US administrations and other countries.**

US interests are not served by postponing meaningful engagement in the region. Without a comprehensive and systematic approach to promoting integration in the Maghreb, threats to the security and stability of the UMA will grow. Greater economic and political integration will enhance the prospects and opportunities for the people of the Maghreb; in its absence, there will be more instability. The US should overcome past neglect and take the lead in promoting the future of the Maghreb.

*[The document is the result of an independent task force on an issue of critical importance to US foreign policy, where it seems that a group diverse in backgrounds and perspectives may nonetheless be able to reach a meaningful consensus on policy through private and nonpartisan deliberations. Task force members are asked to join a consensus signifying that they endorse the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, though not necessarily every finding and recommendation.]*





# The History of the Western Sahara

## A Timeline

The sovereignty of the Western Sahara remains the subject of a dispute between Morocco and the Polisario Front, a separatist group based in southern Algeria. Morocco reasserted its sovereignty over the territory after Spain withdrew its colonial interests from the area in 1975. The Polisario Front has challenged Morocco's control over the Western Sahara.

The Moroccan Government has undertaken a sizable economic development program in the Western Sahara to provide economic, political and social infrastructure for the region's residents. Today, international efforts are underway to encourage a political settlement between Morocco, the Polisario Front, and Algeria that would resolve sovereignty over the Western Sahara through autonomy.

**1578 to 1727** Moroccan Kings rule over the territory currently known as the Western Sahara

**1884** Spanish colonization begins

**1956** Morocco claims independence from France

Morocco reclaims the Western Sahara at the UN for the first time

**1958** King Mohammed V formally lays claim to the Sahara

**1963** The UN includes the Western Sahara on the list of non self-governing territories

**1965** The UN General Assembly adopts its first resolution calling on Spain to decolonize the Sahara

**1973** The Polisario Front is founded and stages its first attack

**1974** Algeria begins to oppose Moroccan policy on the Sahara and trains Polisario guerillas

**1975** The Green March takes place in which 350,000 unarmed Moroccans march South into the desert to reassert the sovereignty of the Sahara from the Spanish

Morocco signs Madrid Agreement which seeks to transfer control of the Sahara to a three party administration divided between Morocco, Spain and Mauritania

Spain officially terminates its administration of the Sahara

**1976** The Polisario declares the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and raises the flag of "Western Sahara"

**1977** Spanish-Moroccan fishing agreement is signed; the Polisario begins attacks on Spanish fishing vessels

**1990** Morocco and the Polisario accept a UN peace plan, in which a referendum will be held.

**1991** UN Security Council approves the establishment of Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara (MINURSO)

*"By giving the people of the Western Sahara a true voice in their future through the full benefits of autonomy as presented by Morocco, a credible political solution can be achieved."*

*-Former U.S. Sec. of State Madeleine Albright, June 6, 2007*



*"[T]he Kingdom [of Morocco] has proposed a serious and credible autonomy plan as a basis of negotiation [...] and it constitutes a new proposal element after years of stalemate."*

*-French President Nicolas Sarkozy, October 23, 2007*

*"My conclusion that an independent Western Sahara is not an attainable goal is relevant today because it lies at the root of the current negotiation process."*

*- UN Secretary General's Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara Peter Van Walsum, April 21, 2008*

Cease-fire declared in the disputed Western Sahara region

Former US Sec. of State James Baker III appointed as UN Special Envoy in the Sahara region

Houston Accord is signed between Morocco and Polisario establishing the implementation of a referendum to decide the future of the Western Sahara

UN Sec. Gen. Kofi Annan presents the Security Council with four options to break the impasse in the Western Sahara: referendum, autonomy, partition, or complete withdrawal

James Baker III announces the "new Baker Plan" for Self-Determination which describes a proposed Western Sahara Authority to administer the territory autonomously until 2007 or 2008, when the referendum would be held

Dutch ambassador Peter Van Walsum is confirmed as the new UN Sec. Gen. Special Envoy to the Western Sahara

Morocco releases autonomy under sovereignty plan for the Western Sahara which is endorsed by the United States, Spain and France

Morocco and the Polisario Front conduct first two rounds of negotiations

The Polisario Front threatens a return to armed conflict with Morocco

Third round of negotiations between Morocco and the Polisario Front takes place in January; a fourth round resumes in March

UN Sec. Gen. Special Envoy Van Walsum calls for realism and deems independence an unattainable option. Parties to the negotiations agree to a fifth round of negotiations to take place at a later date.

UN Sec. Gen. appoints seasoned US Diplomat Christopher Ross as the new Special Envoy for the Western Sahara.



### **Assessment of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara**

1. During my visit to the region, I told each of my hosts that I stood by the conclusions I had drawn in my first briefing to the Security Council on 18 January 2006. As the Council had made it clear from the outset that it could only contemplate a consensual solution to the question of Western Sahara and, more specifically, had not reacted in 2004 when Morocco decided that it could not consent to any referendum in which independence was an option, I had concluded that there was no pressure on Morocco to abandon its claim of sovereignty over the Territory and, therefore, that an independent Western Sahara was not a realistic proposition. I felt it necessary to reiterate this conclusion, because it might have become obscured by the fact that both the Moroccan proposal and that of the Frente Polisario were on the agenda of the Manhasset negotiations.
2. My interlocutors in Tindouf and Algiers did not contest my analysis, but disagreed strongly with my conclusion; first, because international legality had to prevail, and second, because the circumstances I described as 'reality' might change.
3. My conclusion that an independent Western Sahara is not an attainable goal is relevant today because it lies at the root of the current negotiation process. In my briefing to the Security Council in January 2006, I observed that once the Council recognized that Morocco would not be made to give up its claim to Western Sahara, it would realize that there were only two options: indefinite prolongation of the deadlock or direct negotiations between the parties.
4. On this basis, Secretary-General Annan recommended, first in April and again in October 2006, that the Security Council call on the two parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions. The Security Council did not act on these recommendations. In the second week of April 2007, both parties introduced their respective proposals for the solution of the question of Western Sahara. In his report to the Security Council of 13 April 2007 (S/2007/202), the Secretary-General acknowledged receipt of both proposals and repeated the recommendation to call on the two parties to enter into negotiations without preconditions. Subsequently, in its resolution 1754 (2007) of 30 April 2007, the Security Council took note of both proposals and followed the Secretary-General's recommendation, presumably due to the impact of the Moroccan proposal to negotiate an autonomy statute for the region. And finally, during the first round of the negotiations, on 18 June 2007, I explained to the parties that I had drawn the conclusion that both proposals were on the agenda.
5. Although this procedure cannot be faulted, its outcome is paradoxical. While Morocco's rejection of a referendum with independence as an option had triggered the Council's recourse to recommending negotiations without preconditions, one of the two proposals that are now on the table in these negotiations demands precisely the holding of a referendum with independence as an option. This contradiction may explain why the negotiation process is not leading anywhere: the fundamental positions of the two parties are mutually exclusive. What is an absolute necessity for one is absolutely unacceptable

for the other. For the Frente Polisario, a referendum with independence as an option is indispensable for the achievement of self-determination, whereas Morocco is unable to accept such a referendum, but believes self-determination can be achieved through other forms of popular consultation.

6. As a result, an even more unyielding impasse has established itself right in the heart of the process that was meant to show a way out of the impasse brought about by Morocco's rejection of the Baker Plan (Peace Plan for Self-Determination of the People of Western Sahara) in 2004 (S/2004/325). A month after the end of my latest tour of the region from 5-15 February 2008, the parties and neighbouring countries met again in Manhasset, from 16-18 March 2008, for the fourth round of their talks. As had been the case in the first three rounds, from 18-19 June and 10-11 August 2007 and 7-9 January 2008, there was hardly any exchange that could be characterized as negotiations. Since April 2007, the equal treatment the Secretary-General had allotted to the two proposals had been progressively modified by the Security Council through the addition of certain references to the Moroccan proposal. First, in resolution 1754 (2007), the Council had inserted the words "welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution" (fifth preambular paragraph) and called upon the parties to take into account "the developments of the last months" (paragraph 2), and later, in resolution 1783 (2007), it had expanded the latter phrase to: "taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and developments of the last months." In Manhasset, I reminded the delegations that these insertions were integral parts of the two Security Council resolutions, as was the Council's "taking note" of both proposals.

7. Both parties repeatedly commented on the exact meaning of resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), and, it goes without saying, they attached paramount importance to very different elements. For the Frente Polisario, all that matters is that both proposals are on the table, while according to Morocco the Council has established a clear order between the two. This exercise in textual explanation may be intellectually challenging, but it does not yield the kind of authoritative interpretation that induces the parties to reconsider their positions and to negotiate a compromise solution. What is needed is clearer guidance from the Council itself. I am, of course, aware of the constraints under which Security Council resolutions come into being; but the answer to the vital question of whether one proposal has priority over the other cannot be left to the inevitably controversial interpretation of a number of indistinct phrases. If the Council cannot make a choice, the parties cannot either.

8. There is no conceivable compromise between the parties' views on the role of a referendum with independence as an option. However, I had hoped that the parties, who at the conclusion of the second round of talks agreed that the current *status quo* was unacceptable, would sooner or later show some willingness to explore the implications of possible movement on the basis of the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed;" but in four rounds of talks, no sign of such willingness has been detected. Therefore, the process is at a standstill, despite the agreement to meet for a fifth round at a date still to be determined.



9. Much will now depend on the interaction between the Security Council's adoption of a new resolution before the end of April, and that fifth round of the negotiation process. If the Council simply extends the process begun by resolution 1754 (2007) and continued by resolution 1783 (2007), there is no doubt that the fifth round will be no different from the first four, and the process will be rightly regarded as deadlocked. Yet, this seems the most likely outcome because in the wider international community the feeling that the *status quo* in Western Sahara is unacceptable is far less prevalent than the feeling that, on balance and all alternatives considered, it may be the least disadvantageous option. Numerous countries consider the *status quo* quite tolerable because it relieves them from the necessity of making painful choices, such as taking sides between Algeria and Morocco. Consolidation of the *status quo* may well be the natural outcome – so to speak, the *default mode* – of the negotiation process.

10. Apart from what the Security Council may or may not be able to do, countries that have close ties with either party might make a greater effort at counteracting that party's tendency to overestimate the strength of its position. Both parties are quick to interpret positive comments from third countries as support for their cause. I have the impression that the prevalence of this phenomenon is responsible for a large number of misconceptions that weaken the political will to search for compromise solutions. In the international community, there is a widespread view that legally the Frente Polisario has the stronger case, but that it is not incumbent on the Security Council to pressure Morocco to pull out of Western Sahara thirty-three years after its taking possession of the Territory. It is as if the Frente Polisario hears only the first part of this sentence, and Morocco only the second. By far the greatest misconception in this category must be the belief that once the current negotiations have foundered, the Security Council will realize that the question of Western Sahara can only be solved by means of a referendum with independence as an option and take action accordingly.

11. If the negotiations end in stalemate again, the continuation of the *status quo* seems unavoidable. It is highly unlikely that in such a situation the Security Council would unanimously lend its full support to one of the two proposals. Yet, the stalemate would have been caused by the fact that the process was launched with two proposals on the table, one that requires a referendum with independence as an option, and the other that rules that out. A way out of this dilemma might be a tentative and temporary change of focus.

12. To initiate this, the Security Council might ask the parties:

- to reconfirm their acceptance of the principle that "nothing is agreed until everything is agreed";
- to temporarily (e.g. for six to nine months) remove both proposals from the agenda of the talks;
- to negotiate, this time really without preconditions but on the temporary assumption that there will not be a referendum with independence as an option and that, therefore, the outcome will necessarily fall short of full independence.



In addition, the Council might announce its intention to evaluate the process at the end of the trial period. If at that time it perceives the contours of a possible political solution, it may decide to extend the trial period; if it does not, the *status quo* – with the existing incompatible positions of the parties – will resume of itself.

13. I am aware that the removal of the two proposals from the table would be largely symbolic. Still, as the negotiations are hindered by the fact that two irreconcilable proposals are on the table, the right solution might be to remove both of them. Of course, they would not cease to exist; but their status would be clear: they would just be the parties' goals, to be negotiated between them on the basis of two realities:

- (for the Frente Polisario:) that the Security Council will not make Morocco accept a referendum with independence as an option;
- (for Morocco:) that the United Nations does not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over any part of Western Sahara.

It is important to be as explicit about the latter as about the former because, in the context of the current negotiation process, Morocco so consistently refers to its sovereignty over Western Sahara that it would seem advisable to clarify that this can only express a Moroccan claim, so that in case of an unexpected breakdown of the negotiations there will be absolute clarity about the status of Western Sahara as disputed territory.

14. From the outset, I have emphasised the need to respect political reality alongside international legality. Morocco's physical possession of Western Sahara is political reality, but so is the reality that no country has so far recognized its sovereignty over the Territory. This fact is linked to international legality; the two concepts do not exist in separation. What matters is how political reality and international legality interact to enable us to take the best decisions in real life. I do not accept the view that taking political reality into account is a concession or a surrender, and that it is wrong ever to settle for less than pure legality. The choices to be made are not limited to the dilemma between international legality and political reality. There is also a moral dilemma that comes to light when the virtue of international legality is weighed against the consequences of its pursuit for the people of Western Sahara in real life. The main reason why I find the *status quo* intolerable is that it is too readily accepted, not only by uncommitted onlookers in distant lands, but also by deeply involved supporters of the Frente Polisario, who do not live in the camps themselves but are convinced that those who do would rather stay there indefinitely than settle for any negotiated solution that falls short of full independence.



# Security Council

Sixty-third year

Provisional

## 5884<sup>th</sup> meeting

Wednesday, 30 April 2008, 10.25 p.m.  
New York

<i>President:</i>	Mr. Kumalo . . . . .	(South Africa)
<i>Members:</i>	Belgium . . . . .	Mr. Verbeke
	Burkina Faso . . . . .	Mr. Kafando
	China . . . . .	Mr. Liu Zhenmin
	Costa Rica . . . . .	Mr. Urbina
	Croatia . . . . .	Mr. Vilović
	France . . . . .	Mr. Ripert
	Indonesia . . . . .	Mr. Kleib
	Italy . . . . .	Mr. Spatafora
	Libyan Arab Jamahiriya . . . . .	Mr. Dabbashi
	Panama . . . . .	Mr. Suescum
	Russian Federation . . . . .	Mr. Safronkov
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland . . . .	Mr. Quarrey
	United States of America . . . . .	Mr. Wolff
	Viet Nam . . . . .	Mr. Hoang Chi Trung

CRM/ISS/REGISTRATION UNIT  
2009 APR 14 PM 4:30

## Agenda

### The situation concerning Western Sahara

Report of the Secretary-General on the situation concerning Western Sahara  
(S/2008/251)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A.

08-32472 (E)





in favour of the resolution in the hope that through the negotiating process and with the support of MINURSO the people of Western Sahara can one day achieve their right to self-determination.

I now resume my function as President of the Council.

A vote was taken by show of hands.

*In favour:*

Belgium, Burkina Faso, China, Costa Rica, Croatia, France, Indonesia, Italy, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Panama, Russian Federation, South Africa, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Viet Nam

**The President:** There were 15 votes in favour. The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously as resolution 1813 (2008).

I shall now give the floor to those members of the Council who wish to make statements following the voting.

**Mr. Wolff** (United States of America): I had intended to focus my remarks on the issue before us, and will do so. But that does not mean we agree with either the interpretation of the process that led to this resolution or the representation of the arguments presented by Council members on the specific issues raised by both Ambassador Urbina and Ambassador Kumalo reflecting the substance of the issue. But let me focus on the issue as we see it before us.

The Western Sahara conflict has gone on too long, provoking tensions, causing human suffering and preventing progress towards regional integration in North Africa. I am sure that all of us around this table yearn for a mutually agreed political solution to this conflict. Four rounds of discussions in the framework of the latest settlement initiative have, however, confirmed the difficulty of arriving at such a solution, despite the seriousness, dedication and sincerity of the Secretary-General's Personal Envoy, Peter van Walsum.

In the absence of a settlement, my Government judges the mission of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara to be vital and is pleased that the Council has renewed its mandate for a full year; we appreciate the fact that it was done consensually.

It is our hope that this will permit the parties to engage in the search for a solution in a sustained, intensive and creative manner. To encourage them to do so, we intend to broaden our own engagement with them over the coming weeks and months. For our part, we agree with Mr. van Walsum's assessment that an independent Sahrawi State is not a realistic option for resolving the conflict and that genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution. In our view, the focus of future negotiation rounds should therefore be on designing a mutually acceptable autonomy regime that is consistent with the aspirations of the people of the Western Sahara.

In that regard, Morocco has already produced a proposal that the Security Council has qualified as serious and credible, and we urge the POLISARIO to engage Morocco in negotiation of its details — or to submit a comprehensive autonomy proposal of its own.

**Mr. Ripert** (France) (*spoke in French*): With the adoption of resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), the international community unanimously welcomed the end of the stalemate on Western Sahara, with the commencement of negotiations without preconditions and in good faith. The lack of progress in the Manhasset negotiations undermines the search for a mutually acceptable, just and lasting political solution negotiated under United Nations auspices, allowing for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara. The continuation of the status quo in Western Sahara is an obstacle to building an integrated, prosperous Maghreb and poses a threat to the stability of the entire region.

By resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007), the Security Council unanimously welcomed the serious and credible Moroccan efforts to produce an autonomy plan for Western Sahara. That, of course, is not a *sine qua non*: the autonomy plan proposed by Morocco forms the basis for serious and constructive negotiation aimed at a negotiated settlement between the parties, with respect for the principle of self-determination, to which we are committed.

We have taken note with interest of the assessment of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General, which supplements the information set out in the report of the Secretary-General (S/2008/251). We pay tribute once again to Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy for their efforts to resolve the question of Western Sahara.





## Security Council

Distr.: General  
30 April 2008

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### Resolution 1813 (2008)

**Adopted by the Security Council at its 5884th meeting, on  
30 April 2008**

*The Security Council,*

*Recalling* all its previous resolutions on Western Sahara,

*Reaffirming* its strong support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to implement resolutions 1754 (2007) and 1783 (2007),

*Reaffirming* its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect,

*Reiterating* its call upon the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations and with each other to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution,

*Taking note* of the Moroccan proposal presented on 11 April 2007 to the Secretary-General and welcoming serious and credible Moroccan efforts to move the process forward towards resolution; also taking note of the Polisario Front proposal presented 10 April 2007 to the Secretary-General,

*Taking note* of the four rounds of negotiations held under the auspices of the Secretary-General; *welcoming* the progress made by the parties to enter into direct negotiations,

*Welcoming* the agreement of the parties expressed in the Communique of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara of 18 March 2008 to explore the establishment of family visits by land, which would be in addition to the existing program by air, and *encouraging* them to do so in cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,

*Welcoming* the commitment of the parties to continue the process of negotiations through United Nations sponsored talks,

*Noting* the Secretary-General's view that the consolidation of the status quo is not an acceptable outcome of the current process of negotiations, and *noting further*



that progress in the negotiations will have a positive impact on the quality of life of the people of Western Sahara in all its aspects,

*Having considered* the report of the Secretary-General of 14 April 2008 (S/2008/251),

1. *Reaffirms* the need for full respect of the military agreements reached with MINURSO with regard to the ceasefire;
2. *Endorses* the report's recommendation that realism and a spirit of compromise by the parties are essential to maintain the momentum of the process of negotiations;
3. *Calls upon* the parties to continue to show political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to enter into a more intensive and substantive phase of negotiations, thus ensuring implementation of resolutions 1754 and 1783 and the success of negotiations; and *affirms* its strong support for the commitment of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy towards a solution to the question of Western Sahara in this context;
4. *Calls upon* the parties to continue negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, taking into account the efforts made since 2006 and subsequent developments, with a view to achieving a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noting the role and responsibilities of the parties in this respect;
5. *Invites* Member States to lend appropriate assistance to these talks;
6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to keep the Security Council informed on a regular basis on the status and progress of these negotiations under his auspices, and expresses its intention to meet to receive and discuss his report;
7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide a report on the situation in Western Sahara well before the end of the mandate period;
8. *Urges* Member States to provide voluntary contributions to fund Confidence Building Measures that allow for increased contact between separated family members, especially family visits, as well as for other confidence building measures that may be agreed between the parties;
9. *Decides* to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) until 30 April 2009;
10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to continue to take the necessary measures to ensure full compliance in MINURSO with the United Nations zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse and to keep the Council informed, and urges troop-contributing countries to take appropriate preventive action including pre-deployment awareness training, and other action to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel;
11. *Decides* to remain seized of the matter.

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June 6, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush  
President of the United States of America  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave N.W.  
Washington, D.C. 20006

Dear Mr. President:

We applaud the support of your Administration for the adoption of Resolution 1754 by the United Nations Security Council on April 30, 2007, which incorporates the historic initiative by Morocco to end the conflict in the Western Sahara through direct negotiations. This new direction for solving the crisis is in large part the result of your efforts and encouragement.


As the first country to officially recognize the United States in 1777, Morocco has been an historic and reliable ally to our great nation, and we encourage you to continue this cooperation in the challenging months ahead as the negotiations are inaugurated.

Recent terrorist attacks in Morocco and Algeria show that we cannot afford to continue to ignore the problems of this region. Failure to resolve this conflict jeopardizes international stability, our fight against terrorism, and economic integration efforts in the region.

By giving the people of the Western Sahara a true voice in their future through the full benefits of autonomy as presented by Morocco, a credible political solution can be achieved. Morocco's commitment merits the support of the international community and we must ensure that its neighbors assume their responsibility for contributing to the success of these negotiations, as called for in UNSC Resolution 1754.


Mr. President, we know that with your encouragement and support Morocco has courageously shown its leadership with this initiative. Your commitment can make possible a solution to this lingering issue and reaffirm our bipartisan support to a realistic and lasting peace in North Africa.

Sincerely,




Madeleine K. Albright  
Former United States Secretary of State






**Frank Charles Carlucci III**  
Former United States Secretary of Defense




**Mickey Kantor**  
Former United States Secretary of Commerce and  
Former United States Trade Representative




**Hazel R. O'Leary**  
Former United States Secretary of Energy




**Wesley Clark**  
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander




**Ben Gilman**  
Former Member, United States House of Representatives and  
Chairman, House Committee on International Relations



**Thomas Daschle**  
Former United States Senator and Senate Majority Leader




**Thomas R. Pickering**  
Former United States Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and  
Former United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Russia, India,  
Israel, El Salvador, Nigeria, and Jordan



**Martin Indyk**  
Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern  
Affairs and Former United States Ambassador to Israel




**Edward S. Walker Jr.**  
Former Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern  
Affairs and Former United States Ambassador to Israel, Egypt, and the  
United Arab Emirates




**Thomas Nassif**  
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant  
Secretary of State for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and  
South and Central Asian Affairs




**Michael Ussery**  
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant  
Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central  
Asian Affairs




**Frederick Vreeland**  
Former United States Ambassador to Morocco and Deputy Assistant  
Secretary for the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs and  
South and Central Asian Affairs



**Dov Zakheim**  
Former Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and  
Chief Financial Officer for the Department of Defense



**Peter W. Rodman**  
Former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs



**Leon Fuerth**  
Former National Security Advisor to Vice President Albert A. Gore Jr.



**American Jewish Committee**

Office of Government and International Affairs

1156 Fifteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20005 www.ajc.org 202-785-4200 Fax 202-785-4115 E-mail ogia@ajc.org

Jason F. Isaacson  
DIRECTOR

April 19, 2007

Dear Representative:

The American Jewish Committee, an organization that advances inter-religious and inter-ethnic understanding and is dedicated to the success of moderation and pluralism in the Arab and Muslim world, urges your endorsement of a letter circulated by Representatives Ackerman and Diaz-Balart supporting a just-released proposal for autonomy in the disputed Western Sahara under Moroccan sovereignty.

The Ackerman/Diaz-Balart letter asks President Bush to support the Moroccan plan – and seek international acceptance of it – as a sound basis to resolve the Western Sahara conflict, a source of regional instability and human suffering for more than 30 years.

Cognizant of the historic links between – and the broad common interests of – the United States and Morocco, and as an institutional partner of the Moroccan Jewish community, the American Jewish Committee strongly supports efforts by our Government and the Kingdom to enhance cooperation in many spheres, from the struggle against terrorism and extremism, to expanded economic opportunity in the Maghreb, cultural and educational exchange, and political reform. It was our faith in this vital relationship that underlay AJC's support for the U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreement of 2004, and is the foundation of our ongoing dialogue with Moroccan officials and civil society on pressing issues of regional peace, security and human rights.

Reinforced by the recent assertion of Under Secretary Burns that the Moroccan proposal is "serious and credible" and would "provide real autonomy for the Western Sahara," we view U.S. advocacy of this approach as critical to the further enhancement of ties between our nation and the Kingdom, the continued advance of political and economic progress in Morocco, and effective pursuit of cooperative strategies to counter regional instability and international terrorism. We urge your signature on the Ackerman/Diaz-Balart letter to President Bush.

With appreciation for your consideration of AJC's views on this matter, I remain,

Respectfully,

Jason F. Isaacson

This information is distributed by LeClairRyan, A Professional Corporation, a registered agent of the Kingdom of Morocco. 22 U.S.C. §614(b). Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

**American Jewish Committee**  
*A Century of Leadership*



**Congress of the United States**  
Washington, DC 20515

April 26, 2007

The Honorable George W. Bush  
President of the United States  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:


The Kingdom of Morocco, one of our oldest and closest allies, recently submitted a proposal to resolve the three decade long struggle over the Western Sahara. This historic initiative grants profound local autonomy to the Western Sahara while recognizing Morocco's territorial integrity. This compromise is a breakthrough opportunity to find an enduring political solution, and U.S. support is critical to its successful implementation.

As you know, the conflict in the Western Sahara has gone on for too long at great humanitarian cost. Since the 1991 UN imposed cease-fire, all efforts to provide a realistic and durable solution to the conflict have failed. The new Moroccan proposal provides a realistic framework for a negotiated political solution, which is the best way to ensure a lasting peace for all parties.


The United States has a major national security interest in the stability and economic prosperity of North Africa. With al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups expanding their presence into North Africa, we are concerned that the failure to resolve this conflict of more than 30 years poses a danger to U.S. and regional security, while simultaneously preventing the economic integration of the Arab Maghreb Union.

The Moroccan autonomy proposal constitutes an historic opportunity for the United States to help end this problem and provide a better future for the entire region. We urge you to embrace this promising Moroccan initiative so that it receives the consideration necessary to achieve international acceptance.

Sincerely,



Tom Lanto





Lincoln Diaz-Balart (FL)  
Tom Lantos (CA)

David Scott (GA)  
Art Davis (AL)  
Tom Allen (ME)  
David Wu (OR)  
Joe Courtney (CT)  
Allyson Schwartz (PA)  
Mel Watt (NC)  
Jane Harmon (CA)  
Tom Bishop (NY)

Alcee Hastings (FL)  
Ruben Hinojosa (TX)  
Charles Boustany (LA)  
Jeff Fortenberry (NE)  
John Tanner (TN)  
James Clyburn (SC)  
Mary Bono (CA)  
David Scott (GA)  
Chris Murphy (CT)

Shelly Berkeley (NV)  
Solomon Ortiz (TX)  
Bud Cramer (AL)  
Rahm Emanuel (IL)  
Marcy Kaptur (OH)  
Bob Filner (CA)  
Roscoe Bartlett (MD)  
Norm Dicks (WA)  
Jim Moran (VA)

D. Wasserman Schultz (FL)  
Eric Cantor (VA)  
Michael Capuano (MA)  
Jim Costa (CA)  
Edward Markey (MA)  
Henry Waxman (CA)  
Doc Hastings (WA)  
Ken Calvert  
Bart Gordon

Mike McNulty (NY)  
Carolyn Maloney (NY)  
Steve Israel (NY)  
Russ Carnahan (MO)  
William Jefferson (LA)

Gary Ackerman (NY)  
Steny Hoyer (MD)

John Larson (CT)  
Bill Delahunt (MA)  
Barney Frank (MA)  
Ellen Tauscher (CA)  
Jim Matheson (UT)  
Neil Abercrombie (HI)  
Carolyn McCarthy (NY)  
Jim Marshall (GA)  
Elliot Engel (NY)

Tammy Baldwin (WI)  
Vernon Ehlers (MI)  
Keith Ellison (MN)  
John Boehner (OH)  
Pat Murphy (PA)  
Steve Chabot (OH)  
Ron Klein (FL)  
Brian Higgins (NY)  
Adrian Smith (NE)

Ed Pastor (AZ)  
Jerold Nadler (NY)  
Loretta Sanchez (CA)  
Maurice Hinchey (NY)  
Leonard Boswell (IA)  
Nick Rahall (WV)  
Jesse Jackson (IL)  
John Dingell (MI)  
Brad Sherman (CA)

Jean Schmidt (OH)  
Chris Van Hollen (MD)  
Robert Aderholt (AL)  
Mike Pence (IN)  
Anna Eshoo (CA)  
Donald Manzullo (IL)  
Michael McCaul (TX)  
Rick Renzi  
Ed Whitfield

Michael Arcuri (NY)  
Joe Crowley (NY)  
John Barrow (GA)  
Albert Wynn (MD)  
Frank Pallone (NJ)

Steve Rothman (NJ)  
Jose Serrano (NY)  
Robert Wexler (FL)  
Gregory Meeks (NY)

Cliff Sterns (FL)  
Wally Herger (CA)  
Rob Bishop (UT)  
Randy Kuhl (NY)  
Jack Kingston (GA)  
Vito Fossella (NY)  
Chris Cannon (UT)  
Bill Young (FL)  
John McHugh (NY)  
Joe Knollenberg (MI)

Ron Lewis (KY)  
Joe Wilson (SC)  
Dennis Hastert (IL)  
John Duncan (CA)  
Hal Rogers (KY)  
Thad McCotter (MI)  
John Sullivan (OK)  
Steve Buyer (IN)  
Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL)  
Virginia Foxx (NC)

John Mica (FL)  
Dave Weldon (FL)  
Adam Putnam (FL)  
Ric Keller (FL)  
Dan Burton (IN)  
Tom Reynolds (NY)  
Phil Gingrey (GA)  
John Linder (GA)  
Randy Forbes (VA)  
John Shadegg (AZ)

Frank LoBiondo (NJ)  
Tom Feeney (FL)  
Ander Crenshaw (FL)  
Jeff Miller (FL)  
Scott Garrett (NJ)  
Phil English (PA)  
Kevin Brady (TX)  
Gus Bilirakis (FL)  
John Doolittle (CA)  
Tom Tancredo (CO)

Anthony Weiner (NY)  
Janice Schakowsky (IL)  
Dan Boren (OK)  
Edolphus Towns (NY)

Elton Gallegly (CA)  
Chip Pickering (MS)  
Kay Granger (TX)  
Candice Miller (MI)  
Howard Coble (NC)  
Mark Souder (IN)  
Dan Lungren (CA)  
Roy Blunt (MO)  
Lee Terry (NE)  
Steve King (IA)

Walter Jones (NC)  
Mario Diaz-Balart (FL)  
Vern Buchanan (FL)  
Sue Myrick (NC)  
Jo Ann Davis (VA)  
Thelma Drake (VA)  
Spencer Bachus (AL)  
Nathan Deal (GA)  
Lamar Smith (TX)  
Bob Goodlatte (VA)

Darrell Issa (CA)  
Ted Poe (TX)  
Connie Mack (FL)  
Pete Sessions (TX)  
Devin Nunes (CA)  
Tom Price (GA)  
Mike Simpson (ID)  
Sam Johnson (TX)  
Tom Petri (WI)  
Mike Ferguson (NJ)

Ginny Brown-Waite (FL)  
Bill Shuster (PA)  
Steve LaTourette (OH)  
Pat Tiberi (OH)  
Rodney Frelinghuysen (NJ)  
Ray LaHood (IL)  
Brian Bilbray (CA)  
Jerry Weller (IL)  
Buck McKeon (CA)  
Jim Saxton (NJ)



## **The Moroccan Initiative in the Western Sahara**

### **Background:**

The Moroccan initiative comes in response to repeated requests of the United Nations Security Council and several of its key members, including the United States, that Morocco propose a solution to this longstanding problem that could facilitate the opening of negotiations for a "just, durable and peaceful" political solution.

After nearly a decade of trying to bring the Polisario and Morocco to agreement to conduct a referendum to determine the territories future, Kofi Annan, then Secretary General, and James Baker, then Personal Envoy for the Western Sahara, reported to the Security Council that it was not possible to achieve agreement between the Polisario and Morocco on the central issue of who should be permitted to vote in a referendum. Consequently, Annan and Baker recommended that the Security Council encourage Morocco and the Polisario to enter into direct negotiations to find a compromise political solution. The Security Council accepted the assessment of Annan and Baker that a referendum would not be possible, and began a process carried through several years of UNSC resolutions calling for direct negotiations.

James Baker proposed two such compromise political solutions based on the underlying assumption that the proposals would allow Morocco to remain sovereign in the Western Sahara, but that the territory would benefit from a substantial autonomy that would allow it to become self-governing. Morocco accepted the first Baker proposal as the basis for direct negotiations, but the Polisario refused. The Polisario accepted the second Baker proposal, but Morocco refused since it did not allow for direct negotiations between the parties on the terms of the arrangement.

The Moroccan proposal is the first and only proposal to come from one of the Parties to the conflict in response to the Security Council encouragements. In various forms, the Polisario has continued to insist that the referendum be held, and threatens a renewal of hostilities and the eviction of the United Nations peacekeeping force from the territory under its control, despite the fact that the Security Council repeatedly has made clear that this solution is no longer viable.

### **Summary of the Moroccan Initiative:**

The initiative is the product of a year long internal and foreign Moroccan consultation process. All sectors of the Sahrawi population were included in the consultations and the views of foreign governments and expert international authorities were sought before the plan was finalized for presentation to the United Nations.



The plan itself represents an outline for a political solution that traces what Morocco considers to be the broad scope of an autonomy arrangement for the Western Sahara. It does not go into extensive detail on its various aspects on the assumption that such specific arrangements should be the result of direct negotiations rather than the imposition of only one of the parties to the dispute.

The plan provides for a local elected legislature that would subsequently elect an executive authority. It also would establish a separate judiciary for the autonomous region with competence to render justice on matters specific to the autonomous status of the region. The legislature would elect a chief executive.

The formula proposed by Morocco would ensure majority representation in the legislature for Sahrawi inhabitants of the autonomous region, while also ensuring credible legislative representation for non-Sahrawis who have been long-time residents in the territory. Residents of the autonomous region would also continue to elect representatives to the national legislature.

The government of the autonomous region would have exclusive authorities on some issues, shared authority with the central government of Morocco on others and consultative rights on authorities that remain reserved to the central government and that effect the region.

The autonomous government would control local administration, local police, education, cultural development, economic development, regional planning, tourism, investment, trade, public works and transportation, housing, health, sports and social welfare. It would have taxing authorities to support these functions and would continue to receive funding from the central budget as well. It would be able to establish foreign regional trade relations offices and would have consultative rights on other sovereign foreign agreements affecting the region.

The central government would retain exclusive jurisdiction over the normal elements of sovereign authority: national defense, currency, postal, and foreign affairs and religion, over which the Monarchy has a special status in Morocco.

The chief executive of the autonomous region would be elected by the legislature, but would be invested by and serve in the name of the Monarchy.

The initiative also envisages transitional bodies to guide the central government and the autonomous authority through the initial stages of implementation of the plan.

All individual rights guaranteed under the Moroccan Constitution would continue to apply to all residents of the autonomous region.

# MOROCCAN INITIATIVE FOR NEGOTIATING AN AUTONOMY STATUTE FOR THE SAHARA REGION

## I. Morocco's commitment to a final political solution

1. Since 2004, the Security Council has been regularly calling upon *"the parties and States of the region to continue to cooperate fully with the United Nations to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution."*
2. Responding to this call by the international community, the Kingdom of Morocco set a positive, constructive and dynamic process in motion, and pledged to submit an autonomy proposal for the Sahara, within the framework of the Kingdom's sovereignty and national unity.
3. This initiative is part of the endeavors made to build a modern, democratic society, based on the rule of law, collective and individual freedoms, and economic and social development. As such, it brings hope for a better future for the region's populations, puts an end to separation and exile, and promotes reconciliation.
4. Through this initiative, the Kingdom of Morocco guarantees to all Sahrawis, inside as well as outside the territory, that they will hold a privileged position and play a leading role in the bodies and institutions of the region, without discrimination or exclusion.
5. Thus, the Sahara populations will themselves run their affairs democratically, through legislative, executive and judicial bodies enjoying exclusive powers. They will have the financial resources needed for the region's development in all fields, and will take an active part in the nation's economic, social and cultural life.
6. The State will keep its powers in the royal domains, especially with respect to defense, external relations and the constitutional and religious prerogatives of His Majesty the King.
7. The Moroccan initiative, which is made in an open spirit, aims to set the stage for dialogue and a negotiation process that would lead to a mutually acceptable political solution.
8. As the outcome of negotiations, the autonomy statute shall be submitted to the populations concerned for a referendum, in keeping with the principle of self-determination and with the provisions of the UN Charter.
9. To this end, Morocco calls on the other parties to avail the opportunity to write a new chapter in the region's history. Morocco is ready to take part in serious, constructive negotiations in the spirit of this initiative, and to contribute to promoting a climate of trust.
10. To achieve this objective, the Kingdom of Morocco remains willing to cooperate fully with the UN Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy.



## **II. Basic elements of the Moroccan proposal**

11. The Moroccan autonomy project draws inspiration from the relevant proposals of the United Nations Organization, and from the constitutional provisions in force in countries that are geographically and culturally close to Morocco. It is based on internationally recognized norms and standards.

### **A. Powers of the Sahara autonomous Region**

12. In keeping with democratic principles and procedures, and acting through legislative, executive and judicial bodies, the populations of the Sahara autonomous Region shall exercise powers, within the Region's territorial boundaries, mainly over the following:
- Region's local administration, local police force and jurisdictions;
  - in the economic sector: economic development, regional planning, promotion of investment, trade, industry, tourism and agriculture;
  - Region's budget and taxation;
  - infrastructure: water, hydraulic facilities, electricity, public works and transportation;
  - in the social sector: housing, education, health, employment, sports, social welfare and social security;
  - cultural affairs, including promotion of the Saharan Hassani cultural heritage;
  - environment.
13. The Sahara autonomous Region will have the financial resources required for its development in all areas. Resources will come, in particular, from:
- taxes, duties and regional levies enacted by the Region's competent authorities;
  - proceeds from the development of natural resources allocated to the Region;
  - the share of proceeds collected by the State from the development of natural resources located in the Region;
  - the necessary funds allocated in keeping with the principle of national solidarity;
  - proceeds from the Region's assets.
14. The State shall keep exclusive jurisdiction over the following in particular:
- the attributes of sovereignty, especially the flag, the national anthem and the currency;
  - the attributes stemming from the constitutional and religious prerogatives of the King, as Commander of the Faithful and Guarantor of freedom of worship and of individual and collective freedoms;
  - national security, external defense and defense of territorial integrity;
  - external relations;
  - the Kingdom's juridical order.



15. State responsibilities with respect to external relations shall be exercised in consultation with the Sahara autonomous Region for those matters which have a direct bearing on the prerogatives of the Region. The Sahara autonomous Region may, in consultation with the Government, establish cooperation relations with foreign Regions to foster inter-regional dialogue and cooperation.
16. The powers of the State in the Sahara autonomous Region, as stipulated in paragraph 13 above, shall be exercised by a Representative of the Government.
17. Moreover, powers which are not specifically entrusted to a given party shall be exercised by common agreement, on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity.
18. The populations of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be represented in Parliament and in the other national institutions. They shall take part in all national elections.

#### **B. Bodies of the Region**

19. The Parliament of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be made up of members elected by the various Sahrawi tribes, and of members elected by direct universal suffrage, by the Region's population. There shall be adequate representation of women in the Parliament of the Sahara autonomous Region.
20. Executive authority in the Sahara autonomous Region shall lie with a Head of Government, to be elected by the regional Parliament. He shall be invested by the King.  
  
The Head of Government shall be the Representative of the State in the Region.
21. The Head of Government of the Sahara autonomous Region shall form the Region's Cabinet and appoint the administrators needed to exercise the powers devolving upon him, under the present autonomy Statute. He shall be answerable to the Region's Parliament.
22. Courts may be set up by the regional Parliament to give rulings on disputes arising from enforcement of norms enacted by the competent bodies of the Sahara autonomous Region. These courts shall give their rulings with complete independence, in the name of the King.
23. As the highest jurisdiction of the Sahara autonomous Region, the high regional court shall give final decisions regarding the interpretation of the Region's legislation, without prejudice to the powers of the Kingdom's Supreme Court or Constitutional Council.
24. Laws, regulations and court rulings issued by the bodies of the Sahara autonomous Region shall be consistent with the Region's autonomy Statute and with the Kingdom's Constitution.
25. The Region's populations shall enjoy all the guarantees afforded by the Moroccan Constitution in the area of human rights as they are universally recognized.
26. An Economic and Social Council shall be set up in the Sahara autonomous Region. It shall comprise representatives from economic, social, professional and community groups, as well as highly qualified figures.

### **III. Approval and implementation procedure for the autonomy statute**

27. The Region's autonomy statute shall be the subject of negotiations and shall be submitted to the populations concerned in a free referendum. This referendum will constitute a free exercise, by these populations, of their right to self-determination, as per the provisions of international legality, the Charter of the United Nations and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council.
28. To this end, the parties pledge to work jointly and in good faith to foster this political solution and secure its approval by the Sahara populations.
29. Moreover, the Moroccan Constitution shall be amended and the autonomy Statute incorporated into it, in order to guarantee its sustainability and reflect its special place in the country's national juridical architecture.
30. The Kingdom of Morocco shall take all the necessary steps to ensure full integration, into the nation's fabric, of persons to be repatriated. This will be done in a manner which preserves their dignity and guarantees their security and the protection of their property.
31. To this end, the Kingdom of Morocco shall, in particular, declare a blanket amnesty, precluding any legal proceedings, arrest, detention, imprisonment or intimidation of any kind, based on facts covered by this amnesty.
32. Once the parties have agreed on the proposed autonomy, a Transitional Council composed of their representatives shall assist with repatriation, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of armed elements who are outside the territory, as well as with any other action aimed at securing the approval and implementation of the present Statute, including elections.
33. Just like the international community, the Kingdom of Morocco firmly believes today that the solution to the Sahara dispute can only come from negotiations. Accordingly, the proposal it is submitting to the United Nations constitutes a real opportunity for initiating negotiations with a view to reaching a final solution to this dispute, in keeping with international legality, and on the basis of arrangements which are consistent with the goals and principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter.
34. In this respect, Morocco pledges to negotiate in good faith and in a constructive, open spirit to reach a final, mutually acceptable political solution to the dispute plaguing the region. To this end, the Kingdom of Morocco is prepared to make a positive contribution to creating an environment of trust which would contribute to the successful outcome of this initiative.
35. The Kingdom of Morocco hopes the other parties will appreciate the significance and scope of this proposal, realize its merit, and make a positive and constructive contribution to it. The Kingdom of Morocco is of the view that the momentum created by this initiative offers a historic chance to resolve this issue once and for all.